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Abstract: This study proposes a conceptual framework on how financial literacy could 
SOD\ D NH\ UROH LQ VKDSLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ SUHIHUHQFH IRU JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHGLVWULEXWLRQ
policies. Using novel data from the British Election Survey in 2014, we employ two 
distinct ordinal measures of attitudes to redistribution, capturing individual stated 
preferences on whether the government should redistribute incomes and whether the 
government should intervene in making incomes more equal. We find a significant 
negative relationship between financial literacy and attitudes in favour of government 
intervention for income redistribution. The effects are economically important, robust to 
several specifications, samples, in instrumental variable regressions and independent of 
generic attitudes towards other types of inequality/discrimination, e.g. towards females or 
homosexuals. An inquiry into the mechanisms of this significant negative relationship 
suggests that public value and social rivalry effects dominate homo-oeconomicus 
considerations in mediating the effect of financial literacy on attitudes to redistribution.  
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Financial Literacy and Attitudes to Redistribution 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Government intervention to redistribute and limit income inequality is at the heart 
of recent debate in several countries around the world. Individual preferences for 
redistribution lead to different transfer and tax systems. Economic models have focused 
on the impact of current and expected income, future prospects and mobility in 
influencing the demand for redistribution at individual level. Results show that the degree 
of redistribution desired by an individual is negatively correlated with income, wealth and 
better prospects. Some scholars lament that variables employed in the literature, such as 
current and future income and education, are imperfect proxy IRUµHFRQRPLFPRWLYDWLRQs¶
in that they do not completely capture the range and nuisance of economic determinants.  
 Recent studies on the importance of ILQDQFLDOOLWHUDF\VKRZQWKDWSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WR
process economic and financial information is linked with financial planning, wealth 
accumulation, management of credit positions and pensions. We depart from this 
literature and contribute by studying the impact of financial literacy on support for 
redistributive policies. The choice of the tax and transfer system have direct 
consequences on current and future individual financial positions. Hence, our hypothesis 
is that financial literacy is an important determinant of redistributive attitudes. The 
acquisition of financial literacy ma\DOVRFKDQJHVRPHRQH¶VYLHZVRI the social value of 
income equality, independently from their own economic circumstances, the same way 
that some scholars conjecture that economics education may lead people to hold more 
positive views of, say, greed (see e.g., Wang et al., 2011). 
 We use representative subsamples of the British Election Study (BES) 2014 that 
include attitudes towards redistribution and a module on financial literacy, alongside a 
rich set of individual characteristics, including income, education, age, gender, marital 
status, personality traits, risk attitudes.1 We use two variables to capture attitudes to 
UHGLVWULEXWLRQ7KHILUVWYDULDEOHLVWKHDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ³VKRXOGWKHJRYHUQPHQWWU\
                                                          
1
  The BES is an Internet study collected by YouGov and run by a consortium of British Universities. 
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WR PDNH LQFRPHV PRUH HTXDO´ ZKHUH  LV EHLQJ LQ WRWDO GLVDJUHHPHQW DQG  LQ WRWDO
agreement. The second variable is another ordinal variable taking 5 values, from 
µStrongly disagree¶ WR µStrongly agree¶ ZLWK UHIHUHQFH WR WKH VWDWHPHQW ³JRYHUQPHQW
VKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWHLQFRPHIURPWKHEHWWHURIIWRWKRVHZKRDUHOHVVZHOORII´ In 2014 two 
waves were administered in Britain as a whole, while a third wave collected a boosted 
sample of Scottish with the motivation of tracking political and social perceptions 
following the referendum for Scottish independence of September 2014. With an eye on 
robustness, in our analysis we use two samples separately, the standard British sample, 
which consists of more than 5,000 respondents, and the boosted Scottish sample of over 
6,000 participants. The survey offers weights that render our samples representative of 
the whole population in both Britain and Scotland. Financial literacy questions included 
in the survey are the three primary financial literacy questions employed by the literature 
(see Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014) and capture the understanding of interest rates, inflation 
and risk diversification.  
 Our analysis shows that individual with higher degree of financial literacy are less 
supportive of redistributive policies and income equality in Britain. Financial literacy 
shapes those preferences independently from other economic factors, such as education 
and income, and from a rich set of individual characteristics, including personality traits, 
risk attitudes, country of birth and of residence. This effect is also robust to a number of 
functional forms, specifications and interactions and economically important. In linear 
probability models, a correct answer to financially literacy questions leads to a negative 
effect of 9 percent on the probability to be supportive of ³JRYHUQPHQW LQWHUYHQWLRQ WR
PDNHLQFRPHVPRUHHTXDO´DQGSHUFHQWRIEHLQJ in favour of redistributing income to 
the less well off. Ordered probit models add to this analysis by showing that financial 
literacy impacts on the probability of being in clear opposition to redistribution, i.e., it is 
more likely to be in strongly disagreement with redistributive policies than just slightly so 
and these effects are larger in magnitude, i.e. equivalent to 19-26%.  
 The identification assumption is that our financial literacy variable is uncorrelated 
with omitted factors that are not controlled for but are determinants for taxes and 
transfers preferences. Our econometric models include a comprehensive set of socio-
economic determinant discussed in the literature, education and income defined using 
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both very specific categories/classes and continuous variables (and their interactions). 
However, omitted variables cannot be ruled out completely. In order to validate our 
results, we run a series of falsification tests and show that financial literacy is not a 
determinant of generic preferences to other types of inequality/discrimination by running 
regressions of individual support to equal opportunities for homosexuals, females and 
minority groups. In an effort to address endogeneity more directly, we experiment with 
different instrumental variables. The sign, size and statistical significance of the 
parameter of interest are confirmed.  
 We investigate whether our results can be partially explained by variables proposed 
by Corneo and Grüner (2002) and utilized in the literature to capture three main channels 
for individual support to redistribution and equality, namely, homo oeconomicus (a 
measure of pure self-interest), social rivalry (whereby preferences towards redistribution 
are formed in reference to others) and public value effects (a measure of beliefs which is 
independent from individual economic circumstances). We show that that public value 
and social rivalry effects dominate homo-oeconomicus considerations in mediating the 
effect of financial literacy on attitudes to redistribution. 
 The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature, Section 3 presents the data and summary statistics. Then, Section 4 presents the 
estimates and Section 5 provides further robustness analysis, falsification tests and 
instrumental variables. Section 6 considers the possible mechanisms through which 
financial literacy impact the demand for redistribution. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Review of existing literature 
7KHUHLVDYDVWOLWHUDWXUHRQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSUHferences toward redistribution; the aim of this 
section is to briefly summarize it and propose a conceptual framework on how financial 
OLWHUDF\ FDQ SOD\ D NH\ UROH LQ VKDSLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ SUHIHUHQFH IRU JRYHUQPHQW¶V
redistribution policies. 
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2.1 Preferences towards redistribution 
The theoretical literature on redistribution rests on the original works of Romer (1975), 
5REHUWVDQG0HOW]HUDQG5LFKDUGWKHIRFXVLVRQWKHPHGLDQYRWHU¶VXWLOLW\
derived from income. The idea is that with rising inequality the distance between median 
and mean income rises, hence the median voter extracts a higher level of utility from 
income redistribution as inequality rises. Overall, the net benefit derived from 
redistribution is inversely correlated to income. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and 
Benabou and Tirole (2006), among others, expand the theoretical framework so that other 
factors, such as fairness, expected social mobility, are accounted for. They show that 
beliefs about the level of fairness can account for large differences between redistributive 
policies. 
 The empirical literature on redistribution can be divided in broadly two branches. 
The first branch tries to measure preferences towards redistribution at a country and state 
level.  The measure usually employed to capture inequality and favour to redistributiare 
Gini coefficient and the fraction median to mean income (see, Persson and Tabellini, 
1994; Perotti, 1996; and Shelton, 2007; inter alia). 2 
 Overall the picture emerging from these macro analyses is a general lack of 
empirical support on the effect of inequality on redistribution. A possible explanation for 
these results is the fact that there is likely more than one channel at play in the relation 
between preferences for redistribution and inequality and it is empirically challenging to 
capture all these mechanism at once. 
 The second strand of the literature has focused on the use of micro data trying to 
disentangle the determinants of individual preferences for redistribution. In this strand of 
the literature Alesina and Giuliano (2011), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), and Fong 
(2001; 2006), focus their attention on current and expected income and social status; 
Andreoni and Miller, (2002); Fong et al., (2006) and Fong and Oberholzer-Gee (2011) 
                                                          
2
  More recently, Kerr (2014), using survey data from the International Social Security Programme across 
38 countries, shows that a short-term increase in inequality is unlikely to prompt a vicious cycle where 
support for redistribution declines, thereby promoting further increase in inequality. 
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look at the role of behavioral factors, such as beliefs regarding the role of luck and. 
Gruber and Hungerman, (2007) focus their attention on the role of altruism or religion.  
 Corneo and Grüner (2002) propose a theoretical framework to categorize the 
possible channels through which preferences for redistribution can be derived. 
Specifically they identify three mechanisms that could be at play in shaping the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V SUHIHUHQFHV IRU UHGLVWULEXWLRQ )LUVWO\ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH homo oeconomicus 
effect, individuals are driven by self-interest and their preferences are entirely shaped by 
their rank in the income scale. Specifically, preferences are inversely related to the gain 
that the individual obtain from governmental redistribution.3 Second, the public value 
effect states that preferences are unrelated by the level of income, preferences are then 
endowments, such as ethics, the individual was born with.4 The third channel is the social 
rivalry effect KHUH WKH IRFXV LV RQ WKH ³relative leaving standards of the individual´
Corneo and Grüner (2002: p.87); in this framework the social composition of the area the 
individual lives in and the marital status becomes of importance.  
 Given the right data and proxy for these effects, the framework set up by Corneo 
and Grüner (2002) offers a series of hypotheses that can be tested empirically. Overall 
results are mixed, for instance Fong (2001) does not find an effect of self-interest on 
preferences towards redistribution. While Keely and Tan (2008), using GSS data for the 
period 1978-2000 find that among identity markers only race, gender, age, and 
socioeconomic class are important classifiers for income redistribution preferences. 
Similarly, Luttmer (2001) shows how financial self-interest is not the only determinant of 
attitudes toward welfare spending, but other factors could be at play like racial group 
loyalty. More recently, Luttmer and Singhal (2011), try to explain the differences in 
attitude across Europe and the United States, have suggested that also culture could be a 
key a strong and persistent determinant. 
                                                          
3
  On this, see e.g. Meltzer and Richards (1981) and Benabou and Ok (2001). 
4
  This point was recently discussed in Piketty (1998) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) among others. 
Alesina et al. (2001) propoVH D PRGHO ZKHUH WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V XWLOLW\ LV GHSHQGHQW RQ WKH XWLOLWLHV RI
PHPEHUV RI RWKHU HWKQLF JURXSV 7KHLU FRQFOXVLRQ VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V DZDUHQHVV RI HWKQLF
heterogeneity could be the drive for the difference in views on income redistribution across socio-
economic groups. 
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2.2 Link between financial literacy and preferences towards redistribution 
The literature has so far largely ignored the potential link between preferences toward 
inequality and financial literacy. This section tries to fill in the gap by laying out the 
WKHRUHWLFDO FKDQQHO WKRXJK ZKLFK ILQDQFLDO OLWHUDF\ FRXOG DIIHFW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V
preferences for redistribution. As mentioned above, in the traditional literature 
preferences for redistribution depend on economic factors (e.g. Romer, 1975 and Meltzer 
and Richards, 1981). We simply argue that financial literacy is one of the most important, 
albeit overlooked, economic variables.  
 The commonly accepted definition based on The US President's Advisory Council 
RQ )LQDQFLDO /LWHUDF\ 3$&)/  GHILQH ILQDQFLDO OLWHUDF\ DV ³the ability to use 
knowledge and skills to manage financial resources effectively for a lifetime of financial 
well-being´+XQJet al. 2009). In other words, financial literacy is about private benefits. 
In this context, we then should expect financial literacy to be associated with less 
favourable preferences to redistribution.  
 In particular, Jappelli and Padula (2013) sketch a life-cycle model of consumption 
where the level of financial literacy is endogenously determined. Here individuals are 
modelled as rational agents who choose how much to save and how much to invest in 
financial literacy. The prediction is that financial literacy is strongly correlated to future 
wealth. The claim, supported by the data found in Jappelli (2010), is that there is a strong 
negative correlation between the average level of financial literacy within a country and 
how generous social security systems are. A more elaborate idea is that individuals with a 
higher level of financial literacy have a high expected income and may be driven by self-
interest, while individual with a low level of financial literacy have a lower expected 
income and therefore have an incentive to tax the rich (see e.g. Meltzer and Richards, 
1981; and Banabou and Ok, 2001). This suggests that financial literacy should matter 
even when controlling for standard income and educational attainment.  
 FLQDQFLDOOLWHUDF\FRXOGLPSURYHWKHDFFXUDF\RIVXEMHFWLYHHYDOXDWLRQRIRQH¶VRZQ
income position within income distribution, thus reducing biases (Cruces et al., 2013). 
Thus a more financial literate individual would put more emphasis on the role of effort as 
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an additional incentive to achieve a specific socio-economic goal; in other words we have 
a higher the return, both real and perceived to effort. This level of effort would 
necessarily decrease the level of demand for redistribution. This idea is in line with the 
original model on redistribution proposed by Meltzer and Richards (1981), where 
LQGLYLGXDOVKDYHYDULRXVOHYHORISURGXFWLYLW\6LQFHRQH¶VZDJHLVUHODWHGWRSURGXFWLYLW\
those who are not in the position to earn a higher wage than the median income will 
choose not to work. This line of thought seems to find some support on the works of 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Fong (2001) and Krawczyk (2011); they show that the 
LQGLYLGXDOSUHIHUHQFHIRUUHGLVWULEXWLRQDUHLQYHUVHO\FRUUHODWHGWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHOLHI
that future success is determined by effort and talent; whereas those individuals that place 
more emphasis on luck and social connection (help from others) generally do not oppose 
redistribution.  
 A recent strand of the redistribution literature assigns weights to the importance of 
beliefs, context and culture, as drivers that are independent from economic factors (see, 
e.g., Luttmer and Singhal, 2011). The interesting point here is that an individual with a 
high level of financial literacy should rely less on social belief deriving from exogenously 
predetermined factors like faPLO\HFRQRPLFEDFNJURXQGHWKQLFLW\FRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\DQG
religiosity or on personal characteristics like gender and age. However, this is not to say 
that financial literacy does not have any public value effect. The prediction here is that 
the acquisition of financial literacy may change beliefs and values of the benefits of 
equality in the same way that some theories conjecture that economics study lead people 
to hold more positive views on self interest (see e.g., Wang et al., 2011). 
 The definition of financial literacy proposed here has a clear private management 
aspect and ignores any other potential effects or aggregate considerations. If however 
financial literacy embeds also strong elements of economic literacy then one can expect a 
negative relationship to arise from other reasons. Individuals with a high level of 
financial literacy may believe that the a high level of inequality can have positive 
spillovers effects on growth since this provide an incentive both to innovation and 
entrepreneurship as in Lazear and Rosen (1981), or as suggested by Kaldor (1957) by 
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increasing saving and investment given that rich people given that rich people have a 
higher propensity to save.5 
3.  Data and Summary Statistics 
We use data from the µThe British Election Study¶ (BES) conducted in 2014. This 
database contains information on both financial literacy and preferences for 
redistribution, alongside a rich set of individual characteristics. The survey was 
conducted by Yougov and is managed by a consortium of Universities. Although the BES 
includes more than 25,000 individuals, the financial literacy module that we used in this 
paper was administered to a representative subset of respondents. We run our analysis on 
two separate samples for robustness purposes: a standard Great Britain sample (which 
includes England, Wales and Scotland) and a separate (boosted) sample of Scottish 
people that were interviewed at a different time for reasons to do with tracking Scottish 
preferences around the referendum of independence of September 2014. The total amount 
of observations used depends on outcome variable used and ranges from 3,000 to 5,000 
for the GB sample and from 3,700 to 6,200 for the Scottish sample. 
 For our dependent variables, we rely on two specific questions as indicators of the 
VXSSRUWWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVJLYHWRUHGLVWULEXWLRQ³Some people feel that government should 
PDNHPXFKJUHDWHUHIIRUWVWRPDNHSHRSOH¶VLQFRPHVPRUHHTXDO2WKHUSHRSOHIHHOWKDW
JRYHUQPHQW VKRXOG EH PXFK OHVV FRQFHUQHG DERXW KRZ HTXDO SHRSOH¶s incomes are. 
Where would you place yourself on this scale?´7KHUHVSRQGHQWKDYHDVFDOH WRFKRRVH
IURP WKDW JRHV IURP ]HUR WR WHQ ZKHUH ]HUR UHDGV ³Government should try to make 
incomes equal´DQGWHQDV³Government should be less concerned about equal incomes´
7KHVHFRQGTXHVWLRQWRFDSWXUHSUHIHUHQFHVEDVHGRQWKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQ³How much 
do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  Government should redistribute 
income from the better off to those who are less well off´ WKH UHVSRQGHQWs can choose 
                                                          
5
 It is beyond the scope of this work to give, but a homo oeconomicus might also recognize that 
inequality may have long-term negative consequences on growth because it may reduce the 
accumulation of human capital and could bring economic and political instability, which in turn reduces 
investment (see e.g. Galor and Moav, 2004; Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999; Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996). Hence we should expect that an individual who is economically (but not necessarily 
financially) literate is more averse to conservative policies. This would make the expected direction of 
the relation ambiguous. 
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DPRQJ³6WURQJO\GLVDJUHH´³'LVDJUHH´³1HLWKHUDJUHHQRUGLVDJUHH´³$JUHH´³6WURQJO\
DJUHH´³'RQ
WNQRZ´ 
 Table 2 and Table 3 provides some summary statistics on the distribution of the 
respondents. About 42% of the interviewees reported to be in favour or mildly in favour 
of redistribution, while 40% think that the government should be less concern about equal 
incomes. 
 Our key independent variable is the financial literacy index across the GB 
population. This is based on three questions, which have become standard in the 
literature.6 7KHILUVWTXHVWLRQDVNV³Suppose you have £100 in a savings account with an 
interest rate of 2% per year. If you never withdrew any money from this account, how 
much do you think there would be after 5 years?´ 7KH UHVSRQGHQW KDV WKUHH SRVVLEOH
DQVZHUV ³0RUH WKDQ´ ³([DFWO\´ ³/HVV WKDQ´ ³'RQ¶W NQRZ´ ³3UHIHU
QRWWRVD\´7KHVHFRQGTXHVWLRQLV³Suppose inflation is 2% per year and you have put 
money into a savings account with an interest rate of 1% per year. Assuming that you buy 
WKHVDPHWKLQJVWRGD\DQGLQRQH\HDU¶VWLPHGR\RXWKLQN\RXZRXOGEHDEOHWREX\PRUH
with the money in this account in one year than today, less in one year than today, or do 
you think you would be able to buy exactly the same things in one year as today?´7KH
ILYHSRVVLEOHDQVZHUVDUH ³0RUH WKDQ WRGD\´³([DFWO\ WKHVDPHDV WRGD\´³/HVV WKDQ
WRGD\´ ³'RQ¶W NQRZ´ ³3UHIHU QRW WR VD\´ 7KH ILQDO TXHVWLRQ LV ³Which one of the 
following do you think is the riskier asset to invest in?´+HUH WKHSRVVLEOH DQVZHUV DUH
³$QLQGLYLGXDOVKDUHLQDFRPSDQ\´³$SRUWIROLRRIGLIIHUHQWFRPSDQ\VKDUHV´³7KHULVN
LVWKHVDPH´³'RQ¶WNQRZ´³3UHIHUQRWWRVD\´. As shown in Lusardi and Mitchell (2014, 
p.10), these questions captXUH ³L QXPHUDF\ DQG FDSDFLW\ WR GR FDOFXODWLRQV UHODWHG WR
interest rates, such as compound interest; (ii) understanding of inflation; and (iii) 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ULVN GLYHUVLILFDWLRQ´ 7KHVH DUH WKH EDVLF VNLOO UHTXLUHG WR PDNH ORQJ
term decisions on the level of savings and investment. 
 The responses to the three questions are combined to form an index Table 1 gives a 
snapshot of the level of financial literacy in Britain in 2014; about 40% of the people 
surveyed answered correctly to all three questions while about 11% responded incorrectly 
                                                          
6
 See Lusardi and Mitchell (2014). 
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to all questions. The question with the highest number of correct responses was regarding 
inflation, with 80% of the interviewees responding correctly, while the question assessing 
the understanding of risk received 28% of incorrect answers. Although the overall index 
is slightly higher for Great Britain than for Scotland, we see that the patter of right and 
wrong answers is similar. 
 Table 3 gives an overview of the rich set of control variables available in our 
sample. The average person on our sample is 47 years old; he/she has twelve years of 
education and a personal income of about £21,000 and a household income of £32,350. 
30% of the individual interviewed are home owners while 28% have mortgage. In our 
sample we have a 3.5% of people unemployed, this percentage increases to 5.2% among 
the people that are identified has displaying a low level of financial literacy. Overall the 
data in Table 3 corroborate the existing finding of the financial literacy literature in that 
individuals with low levels of financial literacy are more likely to be inactive or 
unemployed, to have a lower income; furthermore, they are less likely to work in the 
private sector and to live in urban areas. Finally, personality traits do not appear to be 
statistically significant between individuals with high and low financial literacy.7 
 
4.  Results 
We estimate specifications of the following form for attitudes towards redistribution: 
Ri = ȕ1 (FLi) +  ȕ2Xi +  șr İi,      (1) 
where: Ri denotes attitudes towards redistribution for individual i, FLi is a variable 
capturing the degree of financial literacy, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, șr is 
a fixed effect for region of residence. As described above we capture preferences to 
redistribution (Ri) by using two separate ordinal outcomes. The first one (RD1) captures 
individual demand for direct government intervention to make incomes more equal, while 
the second one (RD2) asks whether participant believe that the government should 
redistribute income from the better off to the less well off. The vector (Xi) includes a rich 
                                                          
7
  Table A1 in the Appendix shows the correlation matrix. 
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set of individual characteristics such as personal and household income, education, age, 
gender, marital status, household size, number of children at preschool and school age, 
occupation status (whether self-employed, employed, unemployed, inactive or retired), 
trade union membership, ethnicity, country of birth (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, 
Republic of Ireland, Commonwealth, European Union, Rest of the World), house tenure, 
whether the respondent has experienced an income shock last year, preferences to risk 
taking (i.e., a risk taking index from 1, low, to 4, high), political orientation (from 0, left, 
to 10, right), social desirability[explain this] (from 0, low, to 4, high), a variable 
indicating the degree of religiosity, the big 5 personality traits and finally whether the 
individual live in an urban area. In an attempt to isolate the effect of financial literacy 
from potential confounding factors we take advantage of the richness of the survey and 
experiment with different functional forms, specifications and interactions of income, 
education and age variables. 
 For robustness purposes, equation (1) is estimated using both OLS and ordered 
probit to account for the ordered nature of the dependent variables. These two estimation 
methods yield very similar results. Each specification includes sampling weights and 
robust standard errors.  
 Table 4 and Table 5 present results for Great Britain and Scotland, respectively; 
Panels A and B summarize the estimates for the two outcome variables µ*RYHUQPHQW
VKRXOGPDNHLQFRPHVPRUHHTXDO¶3DQHO$DQGµ*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWHWRWKH
OHVVZHOORII¶3DQHO%. Each column presents different specification of equation (1). The 
bottom panel indicates the set of control variables used in each specification.  
 In Table 4 we start with the simplest specification, in which attitudes towards 
redistribution is run on financial literacy without any control variables, and then we 
examine what happen when confounding factors such as education, income and other 
individual characteristics are included in the model. This provides an idea on the 
robustness of the finding and influence of omitted variables. As expected the relation is 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level, implying that financial literacy is 
associated with preferences against redistribution. Specifically, a correct response to the 
financial literacy question is associated with -0.537 (more than half point) on the 10-point 
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scale for the first RD1. The relationship is also economically relevant when compared to 
the (linear) probability of 5.147, the effect is equivalent to 10 percent. With respect to the 
second one, the effect is highly statistically significant but smaller, equivalent to 4 
percent.  
 As the relevant literature has previously suggested there is a direct relationship 
between income, education and financial literacy. To avoid the possibility that our results 
are entirely the product of such a relation, the following columns presents the results 
including different specifications of income, education and age, together with a large set 
of other control variables that we have described above.8 Columns 2 and 8 include 
personal income, education and age as dummy variables, while the following columns 
include continuous version of these variables. In particular, the categorical variable 
µincome FODVV¶KDV been transformed in a continuous variable by assigning to respondents 
the midpoint value of their selected income class (what about top coding?); educational 
attainment has been converted into years of schooling on the basis of how many years are 
required to attain a certain qualification on average in the UK; and age (what about age?).  
 One may argue that what matters in the financial literacy-redistribution relationship 
is the combination of household and personal income. Some individuals with high 
financial literacy might decide for a vocational job that earns less if their spouse can 
compensate for that loss.  Columns 5 and 11 include both personal and household 
income, their polynomial orders to control for potential nonlinearities and their 
interaction to account for all the possible combinations of personal and household income 
within households. Further, in an effort to show that financial literacy is not picking up 
any education effects, we interact financial literacy with years of education. The 
coefficient reported is the main effect of the interaction, so its size cannot be directly 
compared with the other coefficients. It indicates the effect of financial literacy for 
respondents that left school when they were 15. This is notable because it does tell that 
financial literacy impacts preferences even when is completely disentangled from 
education. 
                                                          
8
  Table A2 in the Appendix for the full set of estimated coefficients. 
 14 
 Finally, in order to isolate the effect of financial literacy for all potential 
confounding factors, a fully saturated model in which financial literacy interacts with 
years of education, (log of) personal income and (log of) age are included. The 
coefficient reported shows the main effect of the interaction. 
 All the specifications across the two questions provide strong support to the idea 
that the higher the degree of financial literacy, the weaker the preferences towards 
redistribution. A correct response in the financial literacy question decreases the 
SUREDELOLW\WRDJUHHWR WKHLGHDWKDW WKH³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGWU\WRPDNHLQFRPHVPRUH
HTXDO´and that the ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWHLQFRPHIURPWKHEHWWHURIIWRWKRVH
ZKRDUHOHVVZHOORII´by about 0.4 points on the 10-point scale, and 0.1 points on the 5-
point scale, respectively. These effects are equivalent to 9 percent and 3.4 percent, 
respectively. 
 Similar conclusions can be drawn when analyzing the boosted Scottish sample for 
both outcome variables (Table 5). For the sake of parsimony we present three 
specifications only including the model with full set of interactions. The coefficients are 
all negative and statistically significant at 1% level. Their effect is equivalent to 5 and 2.3 
percent, respectively. We take this as a further robustness check that confirms our 
hypothesis. 
 We then take the specification that includes income, education and age dummy 
variables ± together the full set of individual characteristics and region fixed effects ± and 
estimate an ordinal probit regression to account for the ordinal nature of the response 
variables.9 Table 6 reports average marginal effects, the predicted probability and the 
percent of the financial literacy effect (i.e., the ratio between the average marginal effect 
and predicted probability that measures the contribution of financial literacy to the 
prediction) for each outcome category for the two redistribution variables. The model is 
estimated on both the GB and Scottish samples. Figure 1 plots the average marginal 
effects and their 95% confidence intervals. These estimates reinforce previous findings 
but also add important nuisance to the analysis. In particular financial literacy exerts a 
sizeable negative impact on the probability of strongly agreeing with redistributive 
                                                          
9
  These specifications are columns 2 and 8 in Table 4 and columns 1 and 4 in Table 5.   
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policies. Focusing on the GB sample, the probability of answering µ<HV¶ WR WKH ILUVW
question declines by 0.033, while the probability of answering µ1R¶ JRHVXSE\
The predicted probabilities for those categories are 0.135 and 0.106, respectively, which 
represent the largest effect in absolute term, 26 and -25 percent. A similar pattern is 
suggested when looking at the second question. Financial literacy decreases the 
probability to strongly agreeing with redistributing income to those who are less well off 
by 14 percent and raises the chance to strongly disagree with that statement by 21 
percent. An identical pattern is uncovered when looking at the Scottish sample. The 
impact of financial literacy on redistribution preferences is slightly smaller for the 
Scottish sample.  Figure 1 visualises the probability changes across each outcome 
category. The average marginal effects are all statistically significant with the exception 
of the mid-category for the first question.  
 This plot makes more evident the larger impact that financial literacy applies on the 
extreme responses µYes¶, µNo¶ and µStrongly Agree¶ or µStrongly Disagree¶. This finding 
is in line with the concept that financial literacy reduces uncertainty and provides more 
confidence when it comes to provide opinion that requires the use of a degree of 
numeracy.  
 Figure 2 and Figure 3 show how the impact of financial literacy varies across 
education and income, respectively. The take home message is that the negative effect 
exerted by financial literacy is quite homogenous over income and education dimensions. 
Interestingly, opposition to government intervention to redistribute or make incomes 
equal is stronger for individuals with high financial literacy but low education. When 
looking at narrow education qualification, a financial literate with a degree has the same 
negative view on redistribution as, say, someone with no formal qualifications in the GB 
sample. Similar homogeneity can be found when looking at income groups, whereby 
financial literacy makes someone less favorable of government intervention to make 
inocmes more equal no matter what level of income. For the individual with high degree 
of financial literacy and incomes the opposition is stronger when asked directly about 
redistribution of incomes (RD2) in both GB and Scottish samples. 
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5.  Falsification and robustness tests 
A concern in our analysis is that financial literacy may be correlated with error term via 
omitted factors measuring generic preferences against equality or equal opportunity. As a 
falsification exercise, we test whether financial literacy is independent of generic 
attitudes towards other types of inequality/discrimination. We do so by running models of 
attitudes to equal opportunities to (a) gay and lesbians, (b) women and (c) ethnic 
minorities. If our financial literacy variable is well defined ± and the model well specified 
± we should not expect it to be systematically related to any of the preferences analysed 
here. Panel A of Table 7 reports estimated coefficients of financial literacy from separate 
OLS regressions run on the GB sample and on the boosted Scottish sample. All the 
coefficients are small in size and statistically insignificant, confirming that financial 
literacy is not capturing feelings of general aversion to equity, which we see as a 
validation of our strategy.  
 The second falsification exercise consists of running our favourite specification 
(Table 4 column 2) using the number of incorrect responses to the financial literacy 
question and the number of µGRQ¶WNQRZV¶ (instead of number of correct responses). This 
model is estimated in Panel B of Table 7 using our two redistribution variables as 
outcomes (RD1 and RD2). Interestingly, these results provide a completely different 
picture. As the number of incorrect answer or µGRQ¶WNQRZV¶ increase, the likelihood of 
being in favour of redistribution and income equality also increases. This is also taken as 
a validation of our strategy.   
 We experiment with instrumental variables regressions in Table 8. The choice of 
valid instruments for financial literacy for the year 2014 in the UK is complicated as the 
exclusion restrictions needed to justify the use of traditional instrumental variable 
methodology is hard to find. For this reason, the first estimates reported uses Lewbel 
(2012) that worked out a method in which instrumental variable approach is applied when 
without traditional instruments. In particular, the first-stage exclusion restriction is 
generated by the control variables which we know are heteroskedastic, i.e. the greater the 
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degree of heteroskedasticity in the error process, the higher will be the correlation of the 
generated instruments with the included endogenous variables. With an eye on 
robustness, these estimates are accompanied by three more instrumental variables 
regressions in which three standard instruments are used as traditional instruments. The 
battery of tests confirms that three out of four instruments are strong (F-test of the 
excluded instruments is well above the rule of thumb of 10 and Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
stats is large). The results confirm our previous analysis in that the estimated coefficients 
are negative and statistically significant. Worth noting that Lewbel (2012) method 
provides also estimates which size is comparable with our previous estimates, while the 
other methods have very large, and perhaps unreasonable, sizes ± as is sometimes typical 
with instrumental variable regressions. To this end, we take Lewbel (2012) as a valid 
approach and if anything as a further robustness check that our analysis is valid. 
 
6.  Mechanisms 
In the previous section we have found that the link between preferences for redistribution 
and the level of LQGLYLGXDO¶VILQDQFLDOOLWHUDF\LVUREXVWWRWKHFKRLFHRIHFRQRPLFFRQWUROV
and to a number of sample, functional forms and specifications. Although this result has 
important implication per se, we can have a more complete picture by dissecting the 
mechanisms through which LQGLYLGXDO¶V financial literacy may mediate the preferences 
for income equality and redistribution. In particular our interest lies on whether the 
previous link between financial literacy and redistributive policies can be captured by any 
of the traditional channel or whether mitigates or amplifies any of these mechanisms. The 
aim of this section is also to disentangle these channels for individuals with high and low 
financial literacy. 
 To this end we make use of the categorization proposed by Corneo and Grüner 
(2002) and the analysis presented in Section 2. There are three important broad set which 
may have an effect on agents when forming their views on public policies. Firstly there is 
a homo-oeconomicus effect, as specified by the traditional literature for a self-centric 
individual what matters is the level of personal income. Here the individual cares only 
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about his/her personal gains from the redistribution. In the absence of a direct measure of 
the pecuniary gains from redistribution, we build a variable (HOE) which measures the 
logarithmic distance between the personal income to the national median income.  
 The second channel is commonly referred as the public value effect. Here the 
DJHQW¶s preferences toward a particular policy are shaped by her public values. As 
presented in Corneo and Gruner (2002) the mechanism may be expressed by some kind 
of social welfare function. The literature has proposed various measures to capture this 
type of information; for instance Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) measure the extent of 
future income prospects in the U.S.; the key result highlights a link between conservative 
policies and RQH¶VSRVLWLRQ LQ WKHVRFLDO ODGGHU/RRNLQJDW WKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ86
and Europe, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) detailed how different cultures may have 
different social function and therefore they tend to emphasize different ways the merits of 
equality and individualism. Other factors derived from personal and family history may 
be also relevant as suggested by (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). In order to 
test the public value effect we construct a variable, PVE, which combines the answers 
from the two questions asking the interviewees whether they µStrongly disagree¶, 
µDisagree¶, µNeither agree nor disagree¶, µAgree¶, µStrongly agree¶, µ'RQ¶W NQRZ¶ two 
statements capturing the individual attitude toward effort. The two statements utilized are 
³:KHQ VRPHRQH LV XQHPSOR\HG LW¶V XVXDOO\ WKURXJK QR IDXOW RI WKHLU RZQ´ DQG ³In 
business, bonuses are a fair way to reward hard work´ 
 Finally, the third mechanism that we are going to explore is what Corneo and 
Gruner (2002) define as the social rivalry effect, here the NH\SRLQWLVRQH¶VUHODWLYHOLYLQJ
standard of the individual. In absence of a specific variable capturing the occupational 
status, we build an index, SRE, based on a combination of personal income and 
education.  
 Results are presented in Table 9. We fist include the three channels alongside the 
financial literacy measure; in column (1) we see that even after the inclusion of the three 
mechanisms reduces its size from -0.537 in Table 4 to -0.427. However, the relation is 
still strongly statistically significant indicating that financial literacy is capturing aspects 
that these standard proxies are not able to. As expected, HOE enters with a statistically 
 19 
significant negative sign, suggesting that there is a negative effect between an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V UHODWLYH LQFRPH DQG KLV SUHIHUHQFHV IRU FRQVHUYDWLYH SROLFLHV RQ
redistribution. PVE and SRE also are found to display a negative and statistically 
significant relation, in line with our previous hypothesis.  
 Columns (2) and (3) split the sample between individuals with high and low 
financial literacy (FLH and FLL, respectively), where FLH represent interviewees who 
answered correctly to 2 to 3 of the financial literacy questions and FLL otherwise. Some 
interesting results emerge from this analysis. All three channels appear still to be negative 
and significant for the FLH. The order of magnitude of the coefficients is comparable 
with those of Corner and Gruner (2002) with the exception of SRE which is found to be 
stronger, in absolute value, in our database [not sure these are comparable across studies]. 
 The picture changes dramatically when we look at those individuals that have 
scored a low level of financial literacy (FLL); for them the only channel driving their 
preferences toward redistribution is the public value effect. The results do not change 
when we enter separately the DVD and the UVD variables. The disappearance of the 
HOE and the SRE channels can be interpreted as financial literacy interacting with the 
two aspects (HOE and SRE), capturing the individual self-awareness. Hence preferences 
for higher redistribution among the individuals with low financial literacy could be 
explained by the fact that these agents have more difficulty to place themselves or their 
peers well in the income scale. 
 
6. Concluding remarks and implications 
This paper examines whether financial literacy shapes preferences towards redistribution. 
We first point out that financial literacy could be an important variable to explain the role 
played by the various mechanisms. We show that the individuals who are with greater 
financial literacy are less likely to report preferences in support of redistribution. Our 
analysis also shows that the size of these effects are economically important and that 
ILQDQFLDO OLWHUDF\ H[HUWV D VWURQJ LQIOXHQFH RQ µH[WUHPH UHVSRQVHV¶ µYes¶, µNo¶ and 
µStrongly Agree¶ or µStrongly Disagree¶. The results are robust under various 
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specifications, a rich set of controls and interactions with income and education. We 
experiment with instrumental variable regressions that confirm our analysis too.  
 The importance of financial literacy in modern economies cannot be 
overemphasized. Financial literacy has a clear public good element to it as it is linked 
with macro financial stability. Our analysis predicts that intervention to improve 
numeracy and literacy in this realm can lead to lower demand for redistribution. This may 
be taken into account when designing the intervention by including elements on 
economics of inequality with the objective to provide a broader view on the subject. 
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Figure 1 
Average marginal effects of financial literacy on attitudes towards redistribution from ordered probit regressions (Great Britain, 2014) 
 
(a) 
Government should try to make incomes more equal (RD1) 
(b) 
Government should redistribute income (RD2) 
Notes: Each graph plots estimates of average marginal effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of financial literacy after separate ordered probit regressions in which a 
redistribution variable (reported on top of each graph) is regressed on financial literacy and a set of controls described in Section 3. All estimates are weighted using 
population level weights. 
0
No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Yes
GB sample
-
.
04
-
.
03
-
.
02
-
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Yes
Scottish sample
-
.
04
-
.
03
-
.
02
-
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
D
is
a
gr
e
e 2 3: Neither
agree nor
disagree
4
5:
 
St
ro
n
gl
y
A
gr
e
e
GB sample
-
.
04
-
.
03
-
.
02
-
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
1:
 
St
ro
n
gl
y
D
is
a
gr
e
e 2 3: Neither
agree nor
disagree
4
5:
 
St
ro
n
gl
y
A
gr
e
e
Scottish sample
 25 
Figure 2 
Average marginal effects of financial literacy on attitudes towards redistribution by education 
 
 
Notes: These plots show the impact of financial literacy as education varies. The first plot uses years of 
education (a continuous variable) while the bottom four plots use education qualifications (dummies). RD1 is 
the first outcome (Government should try to make incomes more equal), while RD2 is the second question 
(Government should redistribute income) 
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Figure 3 
Average marginal effects of financial literacy on attitudes towards redistribution by income 
 
 
Notes: These plots show the impact of financial literacy as income varies when income is expressed in classes or 
as a continuous variable. RD1 is the first outcome (Government should try to make incomes more equal), while 
RD2 is the second question (Government should redistribute income) 
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Figure 4   
Average marginal effects of financial literacy on attitudes towards redistribution  
by political orientation and party voting 
 
 
 
Notes:  
  
Left: 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Right: 10
-1.2 -1.1 -1 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
RD1 - GB sample
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
-1.2 -1.1 -1 -.9 -.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
RD1 - Scottish sample
Left: 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Right: 10
-.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
RD2 - GB sample
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
-.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
RD2 - Scottish sample
None
Other party
Plaid Cymru
Green Party
Labour
SNP
Liberal Democrat
Conservative
UKIP
BNP
-1.8 -1.5-1.2 -.9 -.6 -.3 0 .3 .6 .9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3 3.3
RD1 - GB sample
None
Other party
Green Party
Labour
SNP
Liberal Democrat
Conservative
UKIP
BNP
-1.8-1.5 -1.2 -.9 -.6 -.3 0 .3 .6 .9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3 3.3
RD1 - Scottish sample
None
Other party
Plaid Cymru
Green Party
Labour
SNP
Liberal Democrat
Conservative
UKIP
BNP
-1.2 -1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
RD2 - GB sample
None
Other party
Green Party
Labour
SNP
Liberal Democrat
Conservative
UKIP
BNP
-1.2 -1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
RD2 - Scottish sample
 28 
Table 1 
Financial literacy in 2014 Great Britain 
 
Panel A: Financial literacy measures 
 #Correct 
responses 
#Wrong 
responses 
#DK/DA 
responses 
At least one 
"Don't know" 
GB sample 1.99 0.49 0.52 31.25% 
Scottish sample 1.93 0.51 0.56 33.91% 
     
Panel B: Financial literacy: #Correct responses 
 All 3 correct 2 correct 1 correct 0 correct 
GB sample 40.22% 29.45% 19.55% 10.78% 
Scottish sample 37.28% 31.15% 19.12% 12.45% 
     
Panel C: Distribution of financial-literacy responses 
 Correct Incorrect Don't know Refuse 
GB: Compound interest 81.32% 8.88% 9.80% 3.10% 
GB: Inflation 69.09% 12.48% 18.43% 3.18% 
GB: Stock risk 48.68% 27.93% 23.38% 2.41% 
     
Scotland: Compound interest 80.87% 7.96% 11.17% 2.68% 
Scotland: Inflation 65.81% 14.33% 19.85% 2.81% 
Scotland: Stock risk 46.57% 28.57% 24.86% 2.43% 
     
Notes: Weighted averages from the British Election Survey (2014) 
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Table 2 
Frequencies: Attitudes towards redistribution and financial literacy in 2014 Great Britain 
 
Panel A: ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGWU\WRPDNHLQFRPHVPRUHHTXDO´ (%) 
 No:  0 о о 1 о о 2 о о 3 о о 4 о о 5 о о 6 о о 7 о о 8 о о 9 о о 10:  Yes 
GB sample 10.39 3.73 6.66 11.7 7.59 17.49 8.07 9.94 6.7 4.17 13.56 
Fin. literacy: #Correct responses   íí 6.59 1.86 5.07 7.42 5.97 22.18 7.38 8.16 5.25 5.76 24.37 
 íí 7.31 3.50 4.61 9.20 6.50 20.31 5.60 8.37 8.03 4.89 21.69 
 íí 10.11 3.24 6.92 11.83 7.83 17.58 7.56 9.84 6.82 4.53 13.73 
 íí 12.65 4.53 7.68 13.52 8.21 15.3 9.61 11.03 6.33 3.31 7.82 
            
Scottish sample 6.34 1.66 5.10 8.83 6.31 13.60 8.55 11.06 8.32 5.68 24.55 
Fin. literacy: #Correct responses   íí 4.37 1.04 5.41 3.30 6.41 18.94 5.28 7.89 5.48 7.13 34.75 
 íí 5.25 1.54 4.01 6.99 5.99 13.42 5.68 7.08 8.22 6.19 35.63 
 íí 5.35 1.03 4.61 8.97 5.43 13.34 9.09 11.51 8.76 5.79 26.12 
 íí 8.24 2.40 5.94 11.15 7.17 12.41 10.4 13.50 8.80 4.95 15.04 
            
Panel B: ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWHLQFRPHIURPWKHEHWWHURII WRWKRVHZKRDUHOHVVZHOORII´ 
  Strongly Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly Agree 
  о1 о о 2 о о3 о о4 о о5 о 
GB sample  5.10 18.32 24.60 32.68 19.31 
Fin. literacy: #Correct responses   íí  3.12 8.12 26.88 36.77 25.11 
 íí  4.78 13.55 24.16 33.70 23.80 
 íí  3.91 18.24 25.59 33.95 18.30 
 íí  6.52 22.83 23.59 30.41 16.64 
       
Scottish sample  3.77 12.85 20.75 33.60 29.03 
Fin. literacy: #Correct responses   íí  1.49 9.07 24.89 31.83 32.72 
 íí  3.59 9.74 20.32 34.52 31.83 
 íí  2.85 11.60 20.04 35.06 30.44 
 íí  5.29 16.43 20.27 32.54 25.48 
 
Notes: This table shows the distribution of responses to different questions about attitudes towards redistribution in the British Election Survey 
2014/5 and their break down by the number of correct responses in the financial-literacy questions. All statistics are weighted using population level 
weights. 
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Table 3 
Sample averages and mean differences 
 
 Great Britain [5,552 obs.] Scotland [5,387 obs.] 
 All FLH FLL All  FLH FLL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RD1 5.15 4.86 5.92*** 6.23 5.98 6.84*** 
RD2 3.43 3.35 3.63*** 3.71 3.67 3.82*** 
Male 49.4% 53.4%*** 40.1% 47.7% 53.0%*** 36.1% 
Age 47.45 49.42*** 42.93 46.61 47.68*** 44.28 
Years of education 12.89 13.29*** 11.96 12.86 13.43*** 11.63 
Married 58.5% 62.2%*** 50.0% 60.8% 62.3%** 57.5% 
Single 22.6% 19.7% 29.3%*** 27.8% 26.8% 29.9% 
Widowed/divorced/separated 10.5% 10.3% 11.1% 11.4% 10.9% 12.6% 
Household size 2.56 2.51 2.66*** 12.80 7.23 24.91* 
Has young children 21.4% 20.5% 23.5%* 20.5% 19.7% 22.3% 
Urban region 60.2% 58.6% 64.1%*** 35.4% 35.5% 35.1% 
White 91.0% 92.9%*** 86.7% 96.5% 96.9% 95.7% 
Personal income 21,041.0 22,983.8*** 16,579.7 16,709.0 18,691.3*** 12,401.8 
Household income 32,350.5 35,387.1*** 25,377.6 29,580.0 32,627.3*** 22,958.8 
House owner 30.7% 34.4%*** 22.3% 27.6% 30.7%*** 20.8% 
Has mortgage 28.5% 31.0%*** 22.8% 29.4% 32.2%*** 23.1% 
Income shock 14.8% 13.5% 17.9%*** 9.9% 8.8% 12.3%** 
Risk-taking 2.54 2.54 2.54 2.60 2.63*** 2.53 
Left-right orientation 5.14 5.19** 5.03 4.65 4.62 4.73 
Social desirability 1.94 1.98*** 1.82 1.89 1.91 1.83 
Religious 55.2% 55.0% 55.6% 51.4% 50.3% 53.9%* 
Employed 56.3% 57.6%** 53.4% 51.6% 54.2%*** 46.0% 
Student 5.9% 5.0% 7.8%** 8.1% 8.0% 8.4% 
Inactive 11.5% 9.7% 15.6%*** 14.8% 11.4% 22.2%*** 
Unemployed 3.5% 2.7% 5.2%*** 4.3% 3.9% 5.2% 
Retired 22.8% 24.9%*** 17.9% 20.9% 22.4%*** 17.7% 
Self-employed 11.3% 12.7%*** 8.1% 2.1% 2.6%*** 1.1% 
Private sector 39.4% 40.2% 37.7% 1.4% 1.7%* 0.8% 
Public sector 28.4% 28.9% 27.0% 5.3% 4.4% 7.3%** 
Third sector 4.4% 4.4% 4.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 
Other work 5.8% 4.5% 8.8%*** 4.3% 3.4% 6.0%** 
No work 2.9% 2.2% 4.5%*** 2.4% 2.0% 3.3%* 
Union 44.8% 49.7%*** 33.4% 6.7% 7.0% 6.1% 
Agreeableness 6.06 6.06 6.06 6.03 5.98 6.14** 
Conscientiousness 6.75 6.87*** 6.49 6.49 6.60*** 6.27 
Extraversion 4.16 4.07 4.36*** 4.14 4.06 4.31*** 
Neuroticism 3.76 3.61 4.10*** 3.83 3.68 4.16*** 
Openness 5.50 5.53* 5.42 5.53 5.59*** 5.41 
HOE 0.000 0.115*** -0.265 0.003 0.086*** -0.176 
PVE 0.000 0.035*** -0.081 0.059 0.064 0.050 
SRE 0.000 0.033*** -0.076 0.022 0.016 0.035 
DVD 0.000 0.041*** -0.093 0.012 0.015 0.006 
UVD 0.000 -0.015 0.034 -0.024 -0.011 -0.051 
 
Notes: Weighted averages from the British Election Study.  
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Table 4 
Regressions: Attitudes towards redistribution and financial literacy in 2014 Great Britain 
 
Panel A: 'HSHQGHQWYDULDEOHí ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGWU\WRPDNHLQFRPHVPRUHHTXDO´ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses   -0.537***   -0.458***     
  [0.058]     [0.059]        
       
Linear prediction 5.147 5.134     
#Observations 5,066 4,895     
R2 0.029 0.231     
       
Panel B: 'HSHQGHQWYDULDEOHí ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWHLQFRPHIURPWKHEHWWHURIIWRWKRVHZKRDUHOHVVZHOORII´   
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses   -0.151***   -0.117***     
  [0.020]     [0.022]        
       
Linear prediction 3.428 3.425     
#Observations 5,297 5,101     
R2 0.017 0.244     
       
Control variables for both Panels A and B:        
Individual characteristics о + + + + + 
Education (dummy variables) о + о о о о 
Age (dummy variables) о + о о о о 
Personal income (dummy variables) о о + + + + 
Years of education о о + + + + 
Log(Age) о о + + + + 
Log(Personal income) о о о + + + 
Log(Personal income)^2 and ^3 о о о + + + 
Log(Household income)      о о о + + + 
Log(Household income)^2      о о о + + + 
Log(Personal income)*Log(Household income) о о о + + + 
Financial literacy*Years of education о о о о + + 
Fin. literacy*Log(Personal income)*Years of education*Log(Age) о о о о о + 
 
Notes: Individual characteristics include age and education dummies and a set of controls described in Section 3. All estimates are weighted using 
population level weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5 
Attitudes to redistribution and financial literacy in Scotland (BES, 2014, Wave 4)  
 
Panel A: 'HSHQGHQWYDULDEOHí ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGWU\WRPDNHLQFRPHVPRUHHTXDO´ 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses   -0.287***   
  [0.061]      
    
Linear prediction 6.239   
#Observations 4,989   
R2 0.254   
    
Panel B: 'HSYDULDEOHí ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWHLQFRPHIURPWKHEHWWHURIIWRWKRVHZKRDUHOHVVZHOORII´ 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses   -0.089***   
  [0.021]      
    
Linear prediction 3.719   
Observations 4,986   
R2 0.237   
    
Individual characteristics + + + 
Years of education о + + 
Log(Age) о + + 
Personal income ± dummies о + + 
Log(Personal income) о + + 
Log(Personal income)^2 and ^3 о + + 
Log(Household income)      о + + 
Log(Household income)^2      о + + 
Log(Personal income)*Log(Household income) о + + 
Financial literacy*Years of education о + + 
Financial literacy*Log(Personal income)*Years of education*Log(Age) о о + 
 
Notes: Individual characteristics include age and education dummies and a set of controls described in Section 3. All 
estimates are weighted using population level weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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Table 6 
Predicted probabilities and financial literacy effects  
 
Panel A: 'HSHQGHQWYDULDEOHí ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGWU\WRPDNHLQFRPHVPRUHHTXDO´ 
 No о0 о1 о о2 о о3 о о4 о о5 о о6 о о7 о о8 о о9 о Yes о 10 
GB sample            
Fin. literacy AME 0.028*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.033*** 
 [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] 
Predicted probability 0.106 0.036 0.066 0.116 0.076 0.176 0.079 0.101 0.066 0.042 0.135 
% Fin. literacy effect 26.33% 17.55% 14.22% 9.53% 5.35% 0.44% -4.50% -8.28% -12.29% -15.41% -24.51% 
#Observations 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 4,895 
            
Scottish sample 
Fin. literacy AME 0.014*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.031*** 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] 
Predicted probability 0.070 0.018 0.052 0.090 0.064 0.137 0.084 0.111 0.082 0.055 0.237 
% Fin. literacy effect 19.21% 14.12% 12.09% 9.02% 6.40% 3.53% 0.64% -1.85% -4.43% -6.42% -12.98% 
#Observations 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 
            
Panel B: 'HSHQGHQWYDULDEOHí ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWHLQFRPHIURPWKHEHWWHURIIWRWKRVHZKRDUHOHVVZHOORII´ 
 1 о Strongly Disagree о2 о 3 о Neither agree nor disagree о4 о 5 о Strongly Agree 
GB sample      
Fin. literacy AME 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.009*** -0.013*** -0.027*** 
 [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006] 
Predicted probability 0.052 0.184 0.244 0.329 0.191 
% Fin. literacy effect 21.19% 11.17% 3.67% -3.97% -14.30% 
#Observations 5,101 5,101 5,101 5,101 5,101 
      
Scottish sample      
Fin. literacy AME    0.007***    0.014***    0.010***   -0.003***   -0.028*** 
  [0.002]     [0.003]     [0.002]     [0.001]     [0.006]    
Predicted probability 0.038 0.133 0.203 0.336 0.291 
% Fin. literacy effect 17.43% 10.46% 5.06% -0.88% -9.55% 
#Observations 4,986 4,986 4,986 4,986 4,986 
 
Notes: Each panel shows the predicted probability of reporting a category (0-10 for the first model, 1-5 for the second model); probability changes 
due to financial literacy (i.e. the average marginal effect) and the contribution of financial literacy expressed in percent (i.e. the ratio between 
average marginal effect and predicted probability for each category). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7 
Falsification tests and counterfactual hypotheses 
 
Panel A: Financial literacy and attitudes to equality rights  
Please say whether you think these things have gone too far or have not gone far enough in Britain: [1: Not gone nearly far enough - 5: Gone much too far]  
 GB sample Scottish sample 
       
Dep. Variable: Attempts to give equal opportunities to... Gays and lesbians  Women  Ethnic minorities  Gays and lesbians  Women  Ethnic minorities  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses -0.001 -0.021 -0.030 -0.009 0.027 -0.028 
  [0.022]     [0.018]     [0.021]     [0.021]     [0.019]     [0.021]    
       
Linear prediction 3.142 2.735 3.392 2.992 2.561 3.207 
#Observations 5,007 5,104 4,988 4,872 4,974 4,857 
R2 0.215 0.143 0.213 0.251 0.149 0.210 
       
Panel B: Financial illiteracy and attitudes to redistribution: # Incorrect responses 
 GB sample Scottish sample 
       
Dependent. Variable: RD1 RD2 RD1 RD2 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Financial illiteracy: #Wrong responses    0.252*** о    0.103*** о    0.217*** о    0.109*** о 
  [0.084]                [0.030]                [0.082]                 [0.029]               
Financial illiteracy: #DK/DA responses о    0.444*** о    0.075*** о    0.213*** о 0.039 
             [0.071]                 [0.026]                 [0.077]                [0.024]    
         
Linear prediction 5.1341 5.1341 3.4249 3.4249 6.2387 6.2387 3.7191 3.7191 
#Observations 4,895 4,895 5,101 5,101 4,989 4,989 4,986 4,986 
R2 0.217 0.225 0.239 0.238 0.250 0.250 0.236 0.233 
         
Notes: The remaining specification is identical to Column 2 of Table 3. Comments in Table 3 apply.  
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Table 8 
Instrumental variables: financial literacy and attitudes to redistribution in 2014 Great Britain 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable о ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGWU\WRPDNHLQFRPHVPRUHHTXDO´ 
  GB sample   Scottish sample  
Instrument: Lewbel P.F. section FinEdu P.F. section, 
FinEdu 
Lewbel P.F. section FinEdu P.F. section, 
FinEdu 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses -0.577*** -0.964* -1.135* -1.037** -0.217* -0.947* -1.675*** -1.284*** 
 [0.097] [0.497] [0.684] [0.414] [0.112] [0.561] [0.638] [0.418] 
         
Linear prediction 5.134 5.134 5.134 5.134 6.239 6.239 6.239 6.239 
# Observations 4895 4895 4895 4895 4989 4989 4989 4989 
R2 0.229 0.211 0.195 0.204 0.254 0.218 0.095 0.172 
F-statistic 12.93 12.17 11.96 12.11 17.68 16.46 13.90 15.50 
         
Partial R2 of excluded instruments: 0.373 0.008 0.006 0.015 0.325 0.008 0.007 0.015 
F-Test of excluded instruments  25.73*** 36.07*** 19.36*** 27.12*** 21.03*** 36.06*** 27.08*** 30.85*** 
(a) Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Ȥ2 447.18*** 33.67*** 19.22*** 49.51*** 395.53*** 35.62*** 26.41*** 57.17*** 
(b) Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald Ȥ2 2018.9*** 36.65*** 19.68*** 55.12*** 1671.4*** 36.64*** 27.52*** 62.71*** 
(c) Anderson-Rubin Wald test: F 2.24*** 3.79*** 2.89* 3.14** 1.72*** 2.97* 7.80*** 5.40*** 
(c) Stock-Wright LM S-statistic: Ȥ2 109.29*** 3.76* 2.92* 6.38** 91.24 2.94* 7.77*** 10.59*** 
(d) Hansen J statistic Ȥ2 78.479 í í 0.042 90.25 í í 0.74 
Panel B: Dependent variable о ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWHLQFRPHIURPWKHEHWWHURIIWRWKRVHZKRDUHOHVVZHOORII´ 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses -0.073* -0.427** -0.411 -0.421*** -0.072** -0.283 -0.560*** -0.441*** 
 [0.037] [0.178] [0.308] [0.161] [0.036] [0.207] [0.197] [0.138] 
         
Linear prediction 3.409 3.409 3.409 3.409 3.719 3.719 3.719 3.719 
# Observations 5292 5292 5292 5292 4986 4986 4986 4986 
R2 0.238 0.175 0.182 0.178 0.237 0.213 0.094 0.157 
F-statistic 15.25 13.7 13.76 13.74 15.32 14.44 12.36 13.37 
         
Partial R2 of excluded instruments: 0.366 0.009 0.015 0.014 0.339 0.007 0.010 0.017 
F-test of excluded instruments  31.40*** 48.84*** 17.49*** 33.70*** 21.73*** 33.67*** 38.48*** 34.51*** 
(a) Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Ȥ2 463.55*** 45.86*** 17.52*** 62*** 394.6*** 32.13*** 36.25*** 61.41*** 
(b) Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald Ȥ2 2457.1*** 49.57*** 17.75*** 68.42*** 1727.1*** 34.21*** 39.10*** 70.14*** 
(c) Anderson-Rubin Wald test: F 2.06*** 6.16** 1.89 3.94** 1.23* 1.89 9.13*** 5.74*** 
(c) Stock-Wright LM S-statistic: Ȥ2 107.89*** 6.19** 1.90 8.02** 78.61 1.89 9.11*** 11.38*** 
(d) Hansen J statistic Ȥ2 106.13** í í 0.002 73.95 í í 0.885 
 
Notes: Individual characteristics include age and education dummies and a set of controls described in Section 3. All estimates are weighted using population level 
weights. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9  
Mechanisms: Attitudes to redistribution and financial literacy in 2014 Great Britain 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable í  ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGWU\WRPDNHLQFRPHVPRUHHTXDO´ 
 All FLH FLL All FLH FLL 
GB sample  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses      í í  í í 
                                                                                                        
HOE                                                           
                                                                
PVE                                                           
                                                                
SRE                                                        í í í 
                                                                                              
DVD                                                     í í í    
                                                                                              
UVD                                                     í í í    
                                                                                              
Linear prediction                                            
#Observations                                       4,827 3,817 1,010 4,827 3,817 1,010 
       Scottish sample (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses      í í  í í 
                                                                                                        
HOE                                                           
                                                                
PVE                                                           
                                                                
SRE                                                        í í í 
                                                                                              
DVD                                                     í í í    
                                                                                              
UVD                                                     í í í    
                                                                                              
Linear prediction                                            
# Observations                                       4,861 3,810 1,051 4,861 3,810 1,051 
 
      Panel B: ³*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGUHGLVWULEXWHLQFRPHIURPWKHEHWWHURIIWRWKRVHZKRDUHOHVVZHOORII´ 
 All FLH FLL All FLH FLL 
GB sample (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses      í í  í í 
                                                                                                        
HOE                                                           
                                                                
PVE                                                           
                                                                
SRE                                                        í í í 
                                                                                              
DVD                                                     í í í    
                                                                                              
UVD                                                     í í í    
                                                                                              
Linear prediction                                            
#Observations                                       5,031 3,912 1,119 5,031 3,912 1,119 
 
      Scottish sample (19) (21) (23) (20) (22) (24) 
Financial literacy: #Correct responses      í í  í í 
                                                                                              
Table 9 continued in next page 
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Table 9 continued from last page 
 All FLH FLL All FLH FLL 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
HOE                                                           
                                                                
PVE                                                           
                                                                
SRE                                                        í í í 
                                                                                              
DVD                                                     í í í    
                                                                                              
UVD                                                     í í í    
                                                                                              
Linear prediction                                            
#Observations                                       4,855 3,774 1,081 4,855 3,774 1,081 
 
Notes: HOE, PVE and SRE are measures of homo-oeconomicus, public value and social rivalry effects, 
respectively. See section 5 for details. Individual characteristics include age and education dummies and a set 
of controls described in Section 3. All estimates are weighted using population level weights. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Correlation matrix 
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RD1 1.00   0.54* -0.15* -0.02 -0.02  -0.11*  -0.08*  -0.21*   0.05*  -0.05*   0.04*  -0.10* -0.03* 0.00  -0.32* -0.12* -0.11*  0.09* 
RD2   0.43* 1.00  -0.09*  0.04* 0.01  -0.06*  -0.03*  -0.15* 0.02  -0.05*   0.06*  -0.07* -0.04* 0.01  -0.32* -0.13* -0.11*  0.10* 
Financial literacy  -0.17* -0.13* 1.00   0.20*   0.09*   0.22*   0.21*   0.25*  -0.04*   0.08* 0.00   0.12* 0.01   0.13* 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Male  -0.04*  0.02*   0.17* 1.00  -0.02* 0.01   0.18*   0.16*   0.05*   0.08*   0.03* 0.00  -0.03*  0.07* -0.03* -0.03* 0.00   0.04* 
Age  -0.03* 0.01   0.17* -0.02 1.00 -0.32* 0.00 -0.07* -0.46* -0.20* -0.16*  0.50*  0.08* -0.03* -0.14* 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Years of Education  -0.07* -0.07*  0.17* -0.03* -0.36* 1.00  0.18*  0.28*  0.16*  0.19*  0.08* -0.11* -0.05*  0.10* 0.01 0.01  0.07*  0.04* 
Log(Pers.  income)  -0.13* -0.12*  0.20*   0.22*  0.08*  0.17* 1.00  0.49* -0.11*  0.43*  0.06* -0.09*  0.12*  0.82*  0.05* 0.00  0.02*  0.03* 
Log(Hous. income)  -0.16* -0.17*  0.25*   0.10* -0.08*  0.27*  0.62* 1.00  -0.23*   0.44*   0.03* 0.00   0.06*  0.21*   0.12* 0.01   0.04* 0.01 
Single   0.06*   0.04* -0.08*  0.09* -0.42*  0.16* -0.17*  -0.20* 1.00  -0.05*   0.13*  -0.22* -0.04* -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 
Employed 0.00  -0.04*  0.05*   0.07* -0.30*  0.19*  0.46*   0.42* 0.01 1.00   0.03*  -0.18* -0.02   0.21*   0.13* 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Urban region   0.03*   0.04* -0.06* 0.00 -0.14* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01   0.10*   0.03* 1.00  -0.13* -0.04*  0.04* 0.00 0.01   0.03* 0.00 
Homeowner  -0.08* -0.06*  0.13* -0.02  0.44* -0.09* 0.00 0.00  -0.10*  -0.23*  -0.08* 1.00 0.02 -0.09* -0.06* 0.01 0.02 0.00 
White -0.02  -0.03*  0.10* -0.04*  0.19* -0.08* 0.02   0.04*  -0.09* -0.01  -0.15*  0.08* 1.00  0.05* 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
HOE  -0.13* -0.12*  0.19*   0.21*  0.08*  0.16*  0.98*   0.61*  -0.17*   0.45* -0.01 0.00  0.03* 1.00 0.01 -0.02  0.02*  0.06* 
PVE  -0.25* -0.32*  0.06* -0.01 -0.12*  0.05*  0.10*   0.15* 0.00   0.10* 0.00 -0.04* 0.00  0.09* 1.00   0.07*   0.05* -0.07* 
SRE  -0.13* -0.22*  0.05* 0.00 0.00  0.04*  0.04*   0.07* 0.00 0.01   0.03* 0.02 0.01  0.05*   0.13* 1.00   0.82* -0.83* 
DVD  -0.11* -0.20*  0.05* 0.00 0.00  0.03*  0.07*   0.07* 0.01   0.03* 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.08*   0.11*   0.82* 1.00  -0.37* 
UVD   0.11*   0.16* -0.03* 0.00 0.01 -0.04* 0.00  -0.04* 0.00 0.00  -0.03* -0.01 0.00 0.00  -0.11* -0.83* -0.38* 1.00 
 
Notes: Weighted correlation matrix. Cells below the diagonal are for Great Britain. Cells above the diagonal are for Scotland.  
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Table A2 
Financial literacy and attitudes to redistribution in 2014 Great Britain and Scotland ± Ordered probit regressions 
 
 ܴܦଵீ ஻  ܴܦଶீ ஻  ܴܦଵௌ௖௢௧௟௔௡ௗ  ܴܦଶௌ௖௢௧௟௔௡ௗ  
Financial literacy: #Correct responses             -0.175***  [0.023]      -0.119***  [0.024]      -0.120***  [0.025]      -0.097***  [0.023]    
Personal income: missing                                    -0.248***  [0.084]      -0.211**   [0.088]    -0.091  [0.098]    -0.020  [0.095]    
      -"-: £0-£4,999 per year          {Ref.}  {Ref.} {Ref.}  {Ref.} 
      -"-: £5,000-£9,999 per year                   -0.037  [0.103]    -0.014  [0.097]    -0.011  [0.105]    0.134  [0.102]    
      -"-: £10,000-£14,999 per year                 0.073  [0.095]    0.056  [0.104]    0.058  [0.104]    0.062  [0.100]    
      -"-: £15,000-£19,999 per year                 -0.125  [0.099]    -0.041  [0.102]    -0.030  [0.106]    0.094  [0.103]    
      -"-: £20,000-£24,999 per year                   -0.229**   [0.099]    -0.122  [0.104]    -0.133  [0.111]    0.037  [0.106]    
      -"-: £25,000-£29,999 per year                   -0.189*    [0.100]    -0.111  [0.107]    -0.163  [0.113]    0.073  [0.114]    
      -"-: £30,000-£34,999 per year                   -0.319***  [0.115]    -0.166  [0.112]    -0.13  [0.116]    0.030  [0.116]    
      -"-: £35,000-£39,999 per year                   -0.296**   [0.123]      -0.342***  [0.126]      -0.245**   [0.123]    -0.093  [0.139]    
      -"-: £40,000-£44,999 per year                   -0.382***  [0.146]    -0.205  [0.148]      -0.387***  [0.138]    -0.092  [0.142]    
      -"-: £45,000-£49,999 per year                   -0.254*    [0.146]    -0.102  [0.148]    -0.125  [0.160]    0.232  [0.169]    
      -"-: £50,000-£59,999 per year                   -0.492***  [0.126]    0.024  [0.170]      -0.484***  [0.169]    -0.162  [0.147]    
      -"-: £60,000-£69,999 per year                   -0.421**   [0.164]    -0.204  [0.268]      -0.426**   [0.178]    -0.187  [0.186]    
      -"-: £70,000-£99,999 per year                   -0.698***  [0.151]      -0.421**   [0.207]      -0.540***  [0.180]      -0.421**   [0.208]    
      -"-: >£100,000 per year               -0.220  [0.267]      -0.716***  [0.190]      -0.871***  [0.219]      -0.432*    [0.235]    
Education: None {Ref.}  {Ref.} {Ref.}  {Ref.} 
      -"-: Level 1                                        0.064  [0.118]    -0.155  [0.166]    0.087  [0.113]    -0.024  [0.110]    
      -"-: Level 2                                        -0.014  [0.080]      -0.151**   [0.075]      -0.216**   [0.090]    -0.088  [0.085]    
      -"-: Apprenticeship                                 0.147  [0.140]       0.307*    [0.167]    -0.276  [0.220]    -0.262  [0.171]    
      -"-: Level 3                                           0.272*    [0.141]    -0.025  [0.128]    0.122  [0.185]    0.029  [0.170]    
      -"-: Level 4                                        -0.083  [0.091]      -0.243***  [0.082]      -0.306***  [0.095]      -0.208**   [0.087]    
      -"-: University                                     -0.007  [0.086]    -0.124  [0.082]      -0.284***  [0.091]      -0.145*    [0.085]    
      -"-: Graduate                                       -0.127  [0.103]    -0.022  [0.103]      -0.222**   [0.099]    -0.074  [0.098]    
Age: 15-25 {Ref.}  {Ref.} {Ref.}  {Ref.} 
      -"-: 26-35                                                0.082  [0.108]    0.161  [0.108]    -0.098  [0.110]    0.024  [0.112]    
      -"-: 36-45                                                   0.222**   [0.108]       0.267**   [0.111]    -0.057  [0.114]    0.153  [0.115]    
      -"-: 46-55                                                0.131  [0.109]       0.270**   [0.109]    0.041  [0.115]       0.309***  [0.116]    
      -"-: 56-65                                                0.153  [0.114]       0.422***  [0.111]    -0.037  [0.119]       0.366***  [0.123]    
      -"-: 66-75                                                0.024  [0.126]       0.373***  [0.123]    0.161  [0.136]       0.323**   [0.140]    
      -"-: >76                                                 0.239  [0.164]       0.424***  [0.152]    0.066  [0.190]    0.245  [0.171]    
Male                                                      0.040  [0.042]       0.223***  [0.046]       0.135***  [0.045]       0.302***  [0.044]    
Marital status:  Single {Ref.}  {Ref.} {Ref.}  {Ref.} 
      -"-: Married/Cohabiting/Civil partnership                      -0.048  [0.059]    -0.095  [0.065]    -0.009  [0.060]    0.003  [0.061]    
      -"-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.008  [0.078]    0.034  [0.085]    0.031  [0.080]    -0.001  [0.077]    
Log(Household size)                                       -0.002  [0.049]    0.09  [0.055]    0.026  [0.050]    -0.023  [0.040]    
Table A3 continued in next page 
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Table A3 continued from last page 
 ܴܦଵீ ஻  ܴܦଶீ ஻  ܴܦଵௌ௖௢௧௟௔௡ௗ  ܴܦଶௌ௖௢௧௟௔௡ௗ  
Children at preschool and school age                      -0.040  [0.058]    0.009  [0.060]    -0.069  [0.060]    0.069  [0.058]    
Occupation: Student                                         -0.288**   [0.130]    -0.153  [0.141]      -0.203*    [0.111]    0.051  [0.117]    
      -"-: Employed {Ref.}  {Ref.} {Ref.}  {Ref.} 
      -"-: Inactive                                      -0.069  [0.073]    0.100  [0.072]    -0.015  [0.076]       0.219***  [0.072]    
      -"-: Unemployed                                    -0.015  [0.142]    0.116  [0.140]       0.399***  [0.131]       0.281**   [0.125]    
      -"-: Retired                                         -0.131**   [0.066]    -0.09  [0.059]      -0.154**   [0.067]    -0.054  [0.072]    
Last work: Self-employed                                    -0.115*    [0.066]    -0.088  [0.065]       0.402***  [0.140]    0.263  [0.177]    
      -"-: Private sector {Ref.}  {Ref.} {Ref.}  {Ref.} 
      -"-: Public sector                                  -0.008  [0.047]    0.039  [0.048]    0.172  [0.130]    0.204  [0.127]    
      -"-: Third sector                                   0.063  [0.090]    0.092  [0.084]    0.424  [0.465]    -0.065  [0.451]    
      -"-: Other                                          -0.113  [0.103]       0.207**   [0.102]    0.162  [0.134]    0.095  [0.114]    
      -"-: Never worked                                   -0.109  [0.125]    0.045  [0.130]    0.141  [0.174]    0.187  [0.146]    
Trade union member (current or past)                         0.131***  [0.044]       0.142***  [0.047]    0.103  [0.109]    0.047  [0.112]    
Ethnicity: White {Ref.}  {Ref.} {Ref.}  {Ref.} 
      -"-: Black                                               -0.208  [0.165]    0.071  [0.239]    0.491  [0.750]       0.663*    [0.384]    
      -"-: Mixed                                               0.125  [0.207]    0.308  [0.228]    -0.244  [0.256]    -0.112  [0.317]    
      -"-: Asian                                               0.122  [0.137]    0.061  [0.169]    0.351  [0.229]    0.388  [0.250]    
      -"-: Other                                               -0.111  [0.168]    -0.001  [0.128]    -0.048  [0.121]    0.015  [0.137]    
Country of birth: Scotland                                  -0.186*    [0.100]    -0.056  [0.101]       0.111*    [0.060]    0.083  [0.057]    
      -"-: Wales                                   -0.130  [0.109]       0.307*    [0.176]    0.021  [0.162]    -0.245  [0.168]    
      -"-: Northern Ireland                        0.116  [0.180]    -0.079  [0.258]      -0.392**   [0.193]      -0.710***  [0.244]    
      -"-: Republic of Ireland                     0.018  [0.198]    0.036  [0.167]    -0.172  [0.272]    -0.271  [0.481]    
      -"-: Commonwealth                            0.234  [0.186]    0.037  [0.175]    -0.024  [0.144]    -0.184  [0.203]    
      -"-: European Union                          0.098  [0.137]    0.010  [0.125]    -0.018  [0.148]      -0.396**   [0.189]    
      -"-: Rest of World                           -0.100  [0.179]      -0.298*    [0.160]    -0.014  [0.128]    0.014  [0.162]    
Home owner: Own the leasehold/freehold outright           -0.060  [0.053]      -0.154***  [0.056]      -0.121*    [0.063]      -0.105*    [0.062]    
Mortgage: Buying leasehold/freehold on a mortgage         -0.049  [0.052]      -0.216***  [0.062]    -0.08  [0.059]    -0.078  [0.057]    
Has experienced income shock in last year                    0.170***  [0.062]       0.414***  [0.074]       0.529***  [0.081]       0.559***  [0.082]    
Risk-taker: 1 (Low) - 4 (High)                            -0.035  [0.033]    -0.016  [0.036]    -0.051  [0.036]    -0.056  [0.035]    
Political orientation: 0 (left) - 10 (Right)                -0.186***  [0.011]      -0.195***  [0.011]      -0.220***  [0.012]      -0.238***  [0.012]    
Social desirability: 0 (Low) - 4 (High)                   0.005  [0.018]    -0.008  [0.019]       0.059***  [0.019]       0.037**   [0.018]    
Religiousness                                             -0.026  [0.041]    0.025  [0.043]    0.013  [0.042]    0.057  [0.043]    
BIG5: Agreeableness                                          0.034***  [0.012]    0.014  [0.013]       0.027**   [0.014]    0.022  [0.014]    
      -"-: Conscientiousness                                   -0.010  [0.012]    -0.008  [0.013]    -0.019  [0.013]    -0.010  [0.013]    
      -"-: Extraversion                                          -0.022**   [0.010]    0.003  [0.009]    0.008  [0.010]    -0.004  [0.010]    
      -"-: Neuroticism                                         0.005  [0.010]       0.022**   [0.010]       0.020*    [0.011]       0.032***  [0.011]    
      -"-: Openness                                            0.001  [0.013]    0.005  [0.013]       0.045***  [0.014]       0.038***  [0.014]    
Urban region                                              -0.051  [0.043]    -0.006  [0.047]    0.063  [0.048]       0.131***  [0.048]    
Region: Northeast                                         -0.029  [0.095]    -0.001  [0.112]    о о  
Table A3 continued in next page 
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 ܴܦଵீ ஻  ܴܦଶீ ஻  ܴܦଵௌ௖௢௧௟௔௡ௗ  ܴܦଶௌ௖௢௧௟௔௡ௗ  
      -"-: Northwest                                         0.025  [0.075]    0.009  [0.078]    о о  
      -"-: Yorkshire & Humber                                   0.170**   [0.082]    0.030  [0.085]    о о  
      -"-: East Midlands                                     -0.091  [0.089]    0.012  [0.090]    о о  
      -"-: West Midlands                                     -0.024  [0.082]    -0.127  [0.086]    о о  
      -"-: East England                                      -0.036  [0.081]      -0.160*    [0.084]    о о  
      -"-: Greater London {Ref.}  {Ref.} о о  
      -"-: South East                                        -0.043  [0.075]    -0.034  [0.075]    о о  
      -"-: South West                                        0.091  [0.084]    -0.106  [0.102]    о о  
      -"-: Wales                                               -0.504***  [0.162]    -0.157  [0.136]    о о  
      -"-: Scotland                                          -0.193  [0.153]    -0.140  [0.135]    о о  
Region: Borders                                           о  о  0.249  [0.286]    0.356  [0.338]    
      -"-: Central                                           о  о  0.300  [0.266]    0.174  [0.322]    
      -"-: Dumfries and Galloway                             о  о  0.334  [0.293]    0.263  [0.340]    
      -"-: Fife                                              о  о  0.293  [0.268]    0.272  [0.322]    
      -"-: Grampian                                          о  о  0.160  [0.265]    0.075  [0.322]    
      -"-: Highland                                          о  о  0.344  [0.270]    0.350  [0.325]    
      -"-: Lothian                                           о  о  0.294  [0.259]    0.297  [0.317]    
      -"-: Orkney                                            о  о  0.289  [0.401]    0.399  [0.342]    
      -"-: Strathclyde                                       о  о  0.422  [0.259]    0.326  [0.316]    
      -"-: Tayside                                           о  о  0.298  [0.269]    0.304  [0.322]    
      -"-: Western Isles                                     о  о     0.696*    [0.419]    -0.048  [0.433]    
      -"-: Rest of Great Britain о  о  {Ref.}  {Ref.} 
Cut-off point 1   -2.934***  [0.234]      -2.875***  [0.256]      -2.443***  [0.336]      -2.338***  [0.408]    
      -"-: 2   -2.731***  [0.235]      -1.827***  [0.250]      -2.297***  [0.335]      -1.376***  [0.407]    
      -"-: 3   -2.437***  [0.235]      -1.047***  [0.248]      -1.971***  [0.337]    -0.630  [0.406]    
      -"-: 4   -2.027***  [0.234]    0.039  [0.247]      -1.566***  [0.335]    0.402  [0.405]    
      -"-: 5   -1.792***  [0.234]    о               -1.331***  [0.336]    о             
      -"-: 6   -1.281***  [0.232]    о               -0.892***  [0.336]    о             
      -"-: 7   -1.041***  [0.232]    о               -0.639*    [0.336]    о             
      -"-: 8   -0.702***  [0.231]    о             -0.302  [0.336]    о             
      -"-: 9   -0.437*    [0.231]    о             -0.030  [0.336]    о             
      -"-: 10 -0.234  [0.232]    о             0.170  [0.336]    о             
         No. of Observations                                       4,895  5,101  4,989  4,986  
Pseudo R2                                                 0.056  0.094  0.067  0.097  
Log-likelihood                                            -12,448.5  -7,989.9  -5,143.2  -3,000.4  
LR Ȥ2                                                          685.61***    812.19***    886.08***   852.13***  
         Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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